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International Legal Updates
North America
Family Faces Criminal Charges for
Human Trafficking in Canada
In what has been called Canada’s largest
human trafficking case to date, Ferenc
Domotor Sr. is accused of being the ringleader in a human trafficking and fraud
operation in the City of Hamilton, Ontario,
Canada. Domotor Sr. is currently facing
human trafficking, fraud, conspiracy and
organized crime charges before the Ontario
Superior Court of Justice. Along with multiple alleged co-conspirators, Domotor Sr.
is accused of luring 19 Hungarian nationals
to Canada with the promise of high-paying
jobs. Instead, when they arrived they were
allegedly forced to work as slave laborers
for Domotor Sr.'s family-run stucco and
construction business. The Royal Canadian
Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Canadian
Border Services Agency (CBSA) arrested
ten members of Domotor Sr.’s extended
family on charges of unlawful recruitment
and exploitation of foreign nationals, and
of withholding travel documents. Charges
were also filed against other members of
Domotor Sr.’s family for receiving financial benefit from the exploitation of the
Hungarian workers by collecting the workers’ welfare payments.
Allegedly, Domotor Sr. financed and
arranged for the victims to fly to Canada,
and instructed them to claim refugee status
upon arrival. Domotor Sr. then locked them
in the basements of homes in Hamilton and
Ancaster, Ontario where some were fed
“three-day-old meals that even dogs would
not eat.” Domotor Sr. then allegedly confiscated their passports and forced them
to work at a construction site for seven
days a week without pay. Several victims
claim that they were threatened, ordered
not to leave the houses unaccompanied,
and beaten.
Canada has only recently adopted measures to aid trafficking victims and prosecute traffickers. Trafficking in persons did
not become an offense under the Criminal
Code until November 2005 due to a lack of
widespread awareness about the extent of
the problem and insufficient prioritization

of the issue in the political sphere. Before
this amendment, the Criminal Code did
not contain any provisions that specifically
forbade trafficking in persons, although
several other offenses such as, kidnapping, uttering threats, and extortion were
used to prosecute human traffickers. So
far, however, convictions under the new
law have occurred only in cases involving
Canadian women and girls subjected to
sexual exploitation.
The prosecution of Domotor Sr. marks
the first case of forced labor not involving sexual exploitation that will be tried
under the law. The prosecution of Domotor
Sr. is also significant because the victims
were foreign nationals – a move that may
indicate Canada’s new willingness to prosecute cases involving foreigners rather than
limiting prosecution to cases where victims
are Canadian citizens. This case also highlights what immigration agency records
have suggested: more human trafficking
victims in Canada are forced into manual
labor than are forced into sex trafficking.
In the past decade, Canada has taken
significant steps toward addressing human
trafficking. On October 21, 2010, the
Canadian federal government introduced
the Preventing Human Smugglers from
Abusing Canada’s Immigration System
Act. This legislation proposes extensive
measures to stop human trafficking by making it easier to prosecute human traffickers,
imposing mandatory prison sentences on
convicted human smugglers, and holding
ship owners and operators accountable
for use of their ships in human smuggling
operations. Additionally, in 2002 Canada
ratified the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress
and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime
(the Protocol). Canada made no reservations or declarations and thus is obligated
to uphold all parts of the Protocol. Canada’s
legal obligations under the treaty include
enacting legislative measures to establish
criminal offenses for trafficking, taking
measures to provide trafficking victims
with social and psychological services,
and taking steps to prevent human traffick42

ing. Since May 2006, Canada has started
to provide foreign victims of human trafficking with temporary residence permits
and access to interim healthcare coverage.
Subsequent legislation gave victims the
ability to obtain a work permit.
The successful prosecution of Domotor
Sr. would mark a major step forward for
Canada in combating human trafficking.
The case itself suggests a greater awareness
of importance of enforcing human trafficking laws among Canadian law enforcement
officers and prosecutors, and a greater
willingness to take aggressive measures
to protect victims and punish perpetrators.
Initially, Domotor Sr. was released on CAD
$50,000 bail and the Justice of the Peace
ordered him to surrender his passport,
refrain from travelling outside Ontario, and
remain in his home unless accompanied by
one or more of his sureties. Additionally,
he was ordered not to have any contact
with his alleged trafficking victims or have
any foreign nationals residing with him.
However, at the time of printing, Domotor
Sr.’s bail was revoked and he was in custody awaiting trial.

U.S. Resumes Deportations of
Haitian Nationals Amidst Cholera
Epidemic
Wildrick Guerrier, a Haitian national
and a long-time resident of the U.S., died of
cholera-like symptoms in an overcrowded
Haitian jail approximately one week after
the U.S. deported him for a conviction of
firearms possession. Subjecting Guerrier
to the life-threatening conditions of Haitian
jails appears to be grossly disproportionate
to his offense.
In a February press release, the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR) urged the United States to halt
deportations of Haitians with serious illnesses or family ties in the U.S. The
IACHR asserted that deportation could
endanger the lives of Haitian nationals due
to the continuing humanitarian crisis in
Haiti. The Haitian government routinely
imprisons deportees with a U.S. criminal
record. Prisons in Haiti are overcrowded
and lack potable water, sufficient sanita-
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tion, and access to adequate medical treatment, all of which contribute to the spread
of cholera, tuberculosis, and other diseases.
The IACHR has issued precautionary measures requesting that the U.S. suspend the
deportation of five Haitian nationals until
Haiti can guarantee that detention facilities
meet the necessary minimum standards.
After the earthquake in Haiti in January
2010, the U.S. government designated
Haiti as a country whose nationals could
receive temporary protected status (TPS)
and initially suspended the deportation of
Haitians with criminal convictions. One
year after the earthquake hit Haiti, over
1 million people are still displaced and
hundreds of bodies still have not been
pulled out of the rubble. In addition, Haiti
continues to grapple with a cholera epidemic. While the TPS designation extends
until July 2011, the U.S. resumed deportations of Haitians on January 20, 2011. The
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
claimed to have lifted the moratorium on
deportations because it could not detain
deportable Haitians indefinitely and their
release was not in the interest of national
security.
Many Haitians currently residing in
the U.S. have been granted TPS. TPS
allows foreign nationals to remain in the
U.S. when conditions in their home countries, such as an ongoing armed conflict
or a natural disaster, temporarily prevent
them from returning safely. Those applying for TPS are subject to the eligibility
requirements listed in 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)
and 8 C.F.R. §§ 244.2 — 244.4, however,
meaning they must be nationals of or have
habitually resided in a country designated
for TPS, and must have continuous physical presence in the U.S. since that country’s
most recent TPS designation. Most notably,
an individual is ineligible for TPS if he
has been convicted of any felony or two or
more misdemeanors in the U.S., has persecuted others, is otherwise subject to one of
the bars to asylum, or is subject to one of
the criminal or security related grounds of
inadmissibility. These eligibility requirements have prevented many Haitians, like
Guerrier, from receiving TPS. DHS’s decision to resume deportations places these
individuals at the greatest risk as prison
conditions in Haiti are a breeding ground
for the spread of cholera and other diseases. The current conditions in Haitian
jails support the Center for Constitutional
Rights’s claims that resuming deportations

“would end up being a death sentence for
many.”
Although the deportation and likely
imprisonment of Haitian nationals, especially stemming from two misdemeanor
convictions, seems to violate the guarantee
of proportionality between punishment and
crime under the Eighth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution. The proposition that
the Eighth Amendment does not extend to
deportations on the ground that a deportation is not a punishment for crime has
been upheld since it was first established
by Fing Yue Ting v. United States, 149
U.S. 698 (1893). Nevertheless, there is
something intrinsically disproportionate
about allowing individuals convicted of
misdemeanors to share the same fate as
those convicted of capital offenses, given
the likelihood that imprisonment in Haiti
following deportation will likely lead to
death. While the U.S. is not obligated
to suspend the deportations of Haitians
indefinitely or to extend TPS to ineligible
Haitian nationals residing in the U.S., the
humanitarian concerns in Haiti indicate
that the timing of the agency’s decision to
resume deportations could not be worse.
If nothing else, the U.S. should extend the
moratorium on deportations to Haiti until
the health and political crisis in the country
abates.

Extrajudicial Killings and Police
Brutality in Jamaica
On January 7, 2011, Jamaican police
killed an alleged gang leader, who neighbors claim was innocent and unarmed
when shot by police. This incident follows
the August 2010 release of an amateur
video showing Jamaican police shooting and gruesomely beating to death an
unarmed man after he had been subdued.
These incidents of police brutality and
extrajudicial killings are not the first to surface in Jamaica. Although Jamaica’s population is less than three million, 140 people
die in police shootings each year, making
Jamaica’s rate of lethal police shootings
one of the highest in the world. From 1999
to 2009, 1,900 people were killed in police
shootings, but only one police officer was
convicted of manslaughter – a second was
brought to trial and acquitted on appeal.
Allowing extrajudicial killings denies suspected criminals the rights to due process,
humane treatment, and judicial protection.
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These extrajudicial killings and incidents of police brutality contravene the
American Convention on Human Rights
(ACHR), which Jamaica ratified in 1978.
Article 4 of the ACHR guarantees the
right to life; Article 5, the right to humane
treatment; Article 8, the right to due process; and Article 25 the right to judicial
protection. Jamaica’s systematic failure
to conduct detailed, timely, and impartial
investigations into police shootings and
extrajudicial executions violates the right
to due process and to judicial protection. The Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (IACHR) and the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights have
held that state parties must undertake comprehensive, prompt, and impartial investigation when rights protected under the
ACHR are violated, and that states must
prosecute and punish those responsible for
violations. The IACHR has specifically
expressed concern about the police killings
in Jamaica.
The extrajudicial killings also violate
Jamaica’s international legal obligations
under the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 9 of
the ICCPR guarantees the right to liberty,
the right to be free from arbitrary arrest and
detention, and the right to judicial proceedings. Moreover, Article 2(3) of the ICCPR
obligates States Parties to ensure that those
whose rights have been violated have
access to effective judicial, legislative, and
administrative remedies. However, Jamaica
has declared a state of emergency with
regards to gang violence, and declared to
the United Nations Secretary-General that
it may therefore derogate from many of its
obligations under the ICCPR.
The United Nations also has several
mechanisms to protect against police brutality and extrajudicial killings. Although
these mechanisms are not legally binding, they demonstrate the international
community’s commitment to preventing police brutality. The UN General
Assembly adopted a Code of Conduct
for Law Enforcement Officials (Code of
Conduct) through the passage of resolution
34/169. Article 3 of the Code of Conduct
states that “law enforcement officials may
use force only when strictly necessary
and to the extent required for the performance of their duty.” Similarly, the UN
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and
the Treatment of Offenders adopted the
Basic Principles on the Use of Force and
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Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials
(Basic Principles). The Basic Principles
recommend that police use lethal weapons
only when absolutely necessary to protect
life, and beseech police to respond proportionately to threats and unlawful activities.
The Basic Principles also request the governments of UN Member States to ensure
that arbitrary or abusive use of force and
firearms by law enforcement officials is
punished as a criminal offense. Finally, the
Basic Principles specify that exceptional
circumstances such as internal political
instability or other public emergencies
may not justify any departure from these
principles. Jamaican police use Jamaica’s
high crime rates and gang-related violence to justify the use of disproportionate
force. Jamaica’s National Security Ministry
estimates that there are 268 active gangs
in Jamaica — a country with one of the
highest murder rates in the world. These
statistics, however, do not justify the use of
police brutality under the Basic Principles.
Police must ensure public security without
compromising human rights.
Jamaican police have attempted to
reduce the violence in Jamaica by using
the “hot spot” strategy, whereby police
and military personnel flood a particular
neighborhood and take swift action against
gangs in the area. Opponents criticize this
strategy as an ineffective show of force
that does not end the gang violence. As an
alternative, commentators have suggested
that Jamaica institute a policy of preventive
detention that specifically targets the drug
kingpins and major players in the gangs.
Preventive detention refers to a short-term
strategy that aims to remove the leadership of violent gangs and drug rings from
society in order to prevent the emergence
of “hot spots”— areas where the high level
of gang violence has created a state of
emergency. While this would eliminate the
problem of collective punishment, it would
also create the potential for human rights
abuses associated with pre-trial detention,
including potentially violating suspects’
rights to liberty, due process, and judicial
proceedings.
Important elements of prevention in
relation to extra-judicial killings and police
brutality may be the use of a combination of human rights training for police
officers, community policing techniques,
improvement of support systems for police
who feel that they are in danger, and a
strong judicial system that enforces the

rule of law. These types of solutions would
eliminate the perceived need for police to
take matters into their own hands by assuring that the police are confident that the
judicial system will effectively and justly
punish those engaged in violence. Also,
the judicial system must enforce the laws
with respect to police brutality so that
police officers are also sanctioned for their
acts of violence. Thus, an overall strengthening of the rule of law is likely to help
resolve human rights abuses perpetrated by
Jamaican police.
Aimee Mayer, a J.D. candidate at the American
University Washington College of Law, covers
North America for the Human Rights Brief.

Latin America
Seeking Justice for Victims of
Oil Exploitation in Lago Agrio,
Ecuador
After seventeen years of litigating
Aguinda et al. v. Chevron Corp. in at least
three fora, the Lago Agrio community,
an oil-rich area in the Sucumbíos province of Ecuador, won a judgment against
Chevron-Texaco Corporation for its toxicwaste contamination of the Amazon. On
February 14, 2011, an Ecuadorean court
awarded $8.6 billion in damages, plus
an additional amount for punitive damages if Chevron did not publicly apologize
within fifteen days of the court’s decision
— Chevron did not comply. While the
judgment may be unenforceable because
Chevron-Texaco has no assets in Ecuador,
it is a victory for the implementation of the
American Convention on Human Rights
(ACHR) and numerous other international
agreements that protect individuals’ rights.
The court found that Texaco’s oil operations — before it merged with Chevron
Corporation — from 1964 and 1992 polluted the Ecuadorian and Peruvian rainforest by not properly containing waste pits
for toxic oil exploration byproducts. The
pollution resulted in widespread harm to
the environment and human health.
Two lawsuits were initially filed in
U.S. federal court but were dismissed for
forum non conveniens. Chevron, however,
advocated for and agreed to litigation in
the Ecuadorian courts. This litigation in
Ecuador lasted approximately eight years
prior to February’s judgment. Among
Chevron’s defenses was that it could not be
44

found liable for individual citizens’ complaints because the government of Ecuador
had released it from all liability in two separate contracts. The court, however, rejected
this argument, stating that on their faces, the
agreements only referenced the government
and not suits by individual citizens.
The court explained that even if the
releases had included individuals, the contract would be illegal and in violation of
the fundamental rights protected under
the Constitution of Ecuador and numerous international agreements. The court
also rejected Chevron’s argument that the
state of Ecuador was acting on behalf of
the Ecuadorian people, and that the government-signed release agreements should
bind all Ecuadorian citizens. The court
distinguished governmental acts of representation, which “show the unilateral will
of the state,” from acts where the government is a participatory partner, such as to
contracts with a corporation. Acts where
the government is a partner are not acts of
representation binding all citizens.
Citing Ecuador’s Constitution and the
ACHR, ratified by Ecuador in 1977, the
court held that contracts such as the 1995
and 1998 releases could not extinguish a
plaintiff’s right to bring claims. Article 8.1
of the ACHR guarantees every person the
right to a hearing for the determination of
his or her rights.
The court additionally found a right to
claims in the courts under Article 18 of the
American Declaration of Human Rights
and Duties of Man of 1948, Article 10 the
Universal Declaration of the Human Rights,
and Article 14 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights. The court
reasoned that because the Constitution and
international agreements recognize the right
to a hearing as a fundamental right guaranteed by the state, a state could not relinquish
that right in a contract. Thus, a court could
not interpret the Ecuadorian government’s
prior releases with Texaco as binding on all
affected citizens.
Although the court’s interpretation
of the relationship between states, transnational actors, and individuals upheld
human rights in the face of a development
model that often leaves individuals voiceless, both parties plan to appeal the judgment. Chevron-Texaco claims the trial was
fraudulent and inconsistent with scientific
data, despite the court’s stated attempt to
reconcile both parties’ scientific assess-
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ments and a court-appointed scientific
assessment. The plaintiffs claim that the
$8.6 billion award is insufficient to clean
up the environmental damage.
Regardless of each party’s claims, the
Ecuadorian court’s judgment is unenforceable for now because Chevron-Texaco has
no seizable assets in Ecuador. Furthermore,
one week before the judgment, ChevronTexaco obtained a temporary restraining
order (TRO) from a U.S. court enjoining
the plaintiffs from attempting to enforce
a judgment from the Ecuadorian legal
proceedings in the U.S. The TRO was
extended in March. Overall, however, the
decision can be seen as a step towards
holding transnational companies accountable for the harms they cause.

Amnesty in Uruguay is Rejected
The Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (IACtHR) held that Uruguay’s
amnesty law for crimes committed by the
state during the 1973-1985 military dictatorship violated the American Convention
on Human Rights (ACHR). Gelman v.
Uruguay is the first case against Uruguay
for human rights violations to come before
the IACtHR. Under the ACHR and the
Inter-American Convention on Forced
Disappearance of Persons (IACFDP),
the IACtHR condemned Uruguay for the
forced disappearance of María Claudia
García Iruretagoyena de Gelman. Gelman
was abducted as part of “Operation
Condor,” a joint effort between the dictatorships in Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile,
Brazil, and Argentina to eliminate political
dissidents in the 1970s. In response to the
IACtHR’s decision, the Uruguayan Senate,
passed legislation to annul its amnesty law
on April 12. The legislation must now go to
the lower house for a vote.
Additionally, the IACtHR held that
Uruguay had violated the Rights of the
Family under Article 17 of the ACHR for
crimes against Macarena Gelman Garcia,
María Claudia García Iruretagoyena de
Gelman’s daughter. Article 17(1) provides
that the state must protect the family unit,
as it is the “fundamental group unit of
society.” Garcia did not learn the identity
of her mother until her grandfather tracked
her down twenty years after Gelman’s
abduction.
The case was previously ineligible for
trial in Uruguay because the amnesty law,

the 1986 Expiry Law of Demanded State
Punishment, prohibited nearly all judicial
investigations into the human rights violations committed by military and state
actors during the period covered by the
amnesty law. The case was submitted to
the IACtHR after Uruguay refused to follow the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights’ recommendations to repeal
the amnesty law, conduct investigations,
and provide reparations to victims of state
terrorism.
An alleged political dissident, Gelman
was abducted in 1976 when she was seven
months pregnant. While in detention, she
gave birth to a daughter, Macarena Gelman
Garcia. The baby was then taken from her
and left on the doorstep of a police officer,
who adopted and raised her. Garcia’s husband, Marcelo Gelman, was also abducted,
tortured, and assassinated. María Gelman’s
remains have never been found.
The IACtHR found Uruguay in violation of Articles 3, 4(1), 5(1), 5(2), and 7(1)
of the American Convention on Human
Rights (ACHR) by depriving Gelman of
the rights to recognition as a person before
the law, life, personal liberty, and personal
integrity. Uruguay ratified the Convention
in 1985 when the dictatorship stepped
down and therefore, is bound by its obligations and prohibitions. The IACtHR also
found that Uruguay had violated Articles
1 and 11 of the IACFDP, which Uruguay
ratified in 1996, by practicing forced disappearances and not holding detainees
in officially-recognized detention centers.
Most importantly, the IACtHR declared
Uruguay could no longer use domestic law
to avoid complying with its international
obligations and should ensure the amnesty
law is no longer used as an obstacle for
investigations into forced disappearances.
To eliminate impunity for crimes committed during the twelve-year military rule,
the judgment instructed Uruguay to carry
out investigations of forced disappearances and bring perpetrators to justice. The
IACtHR also mandated the adoption of
policies in compliance with criminal and
administrative responsibilities under international law. In addition to reparations, the
IACtHR ordered the state to make a public
apology for the crimes committed, conduct
investigations into those who remain missing, and make publically available information regarding the forced disappearances.
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The judgment in Gelman is in line with
IACtHR jurisprudence, which prohibits the
use of amnesty laws. In 2001, the IACtHR
held that the Peruvian amnesty law protecting police and military officials who
had engaged in state-sponsored terrorism
from 1980 to 1995 violated the state’s duty
to guarantee domestic legal effects of the
ACHR because the state is obligated to create national laws that uphold human rights
enumerated in the ACHR.
Legislation annulling the amnesty law
is pending in the lower house in Uruguay.
If it passes, it could become law on May
20, which is the day Uruguay honors political dissidents who suffered forced disappearances during the military dictatorship.
Such a public and complete abandonment
of its amnesty law would represent a significant step towards justice and accountability in Uruguay, bringing it in line with
the rest of the Inter-American system in
this regard.
Jessica Lynd, a J.D. candidate at the American
University Washington College of Law, covers
Latin America for the Human Rights Brief.

Middle East and North Africa
Human Rights in an Arab Spring
From arming pro-government protestors with machetes to shooting at civilians
from helicopters, Arab governments have
taken extreme measures to suppress the
protests that have been blazing across the
Middle East for the past five months. What
began in Tunisia spread to Egypt, where
protestors demanding democratic reform
and human rights dismantled long-standing
autocratic regimes. Now civil society in
the rest of the Arab world has taken a cue,
believing that they too are entitled to democratic political reform and basic social,
political, and economic rights.
Despite having similar demands, each
movement in Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Syria,
and Yemen has taken a unique form. The
rules governing the type of permissible
regulatory measures change as civil unrest
grows and becomes more organized. Each
uprising in the Middle East has triggered
distinct international laws. This article is
a survey of the international and domestic
laws that have been implicated in each
conflict, and how they have been observed
or violated.
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Emergency Decrees
Before the protests began, the governments of Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Syria, and
Yemen all violated international law by
prohibiting the rights to assemble and to
freedom of expression. Articles 19 and 21
of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) — which all five
countries have ratified — protect these
rights. However, Egypt’s Emergency Laws,
Syria’s Emergency Laws, and Yemen’s Law
No. 1 on Associations and Foundations
prohibit gatherings without governmental
approval. Under Article 4 of the ICCPR,
emergency laws may suspend these rights,
but the state of emergency may only last
as long as the exigencies of the situation
require. The international community has
recognized that Syria’s emergency law of
48 years and Egypt’s emergency law of
43 years have long exceeded the acceptable period. Further, in Libya, independent
organizations are outlawed pursuant to Law
71 of 1972; thus, any gathering by a group
of people promoting ideologies contrary to
the government is illegal and punishable by
death. Finally, until lifting the restriction
on February 15, 2011, Jordan also prohibited public protests without permission
from the government.
If protests begin to threaten public
order, then states are entitled to enforce
their criminal laws. Still, international law
prohibits law enforcement officers from
using excessive force against peaceful protestors. The Code of Conduct for Law
Enforcement Officials (Code of Conduct)
and the Basic Principles on the Use of
Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement
Officials (Basic Principles) codified international norms regulating law enforcement
officials’ actions. Those documents, which
were adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly in 1979 and 1990, respectively,
draw upon the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UDHR), the ICCPR,
the Declaration on the Protection of All
Persons from Being Subjected to Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, the United
Nations Declaration on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, and the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide. The Basic Principles articulate
that law enforcement officials may only
use firearms in self-defense, in defense of

others against the imminent threat of death
or serious injury, or to arrest and prevent
the escape of those presenting an imminent
threat of death or serious injury. Even then,
officers must clearly identify themselves,
warn of their intent to use firearms, and use
force only to the minimum extent necessary when dispersing unlawful assemblies.
In Libya, Muammar Qaddafi’s forces
are violating these international provisions
by using warplanes and snipers to shoot
indiscriminately at civilian protestors and
to shoot at any group with more than
three people. Additionally, in Egypt and
Syria, there have been widespread reports
of police officers using live ammunition
against retreating protestors, in violation of
the governing international treaties. In fact,
government officials in Syria have killed
hundreds of protestors. The government in
Yemen has also been using live ammunition against protestors, and even coordinated sniper attacks on a protest camp in
March, killing 52 people. In Jordan, on
the other hand, there have been no reports
implicating police officers with using force
against protestors.
It should be especially noted that
Article 8 of the Code of Conduct calls on
officers to rigorously oppose and prevent
any violations of the law and to prevent
violence. Police officers in all five of
these Arab countries have stood by as progovernment supporters, widely suspected
of being government-paid thugs, violently
attacked peaceful pro-democracy activists. By failing to take any action as the
suspected thugs attacked, the police forces
in all of the states have violated Article 8.

Armed Opposition
If the protestors arm themselves, as
they have in Libya and Yemen, then the
state has a limited right to use force
against the protesters. That right expands
and different rights govern once the conflict reaches a certain threshold, rising to
the level of a non-international armed conflict. Additional Protocol II to the Geneva
Conventions provides that International
Humanitarian Law (IHL) does not apply to
situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic
acts of violence, and other similar acts.
This is generally recognized as customary international law. But once opposition movements begin to coordinate their
attacks under an organized command
46

structure in a contracted conflict, IHL is
triggered. In that case, the state would have
the right to attack opposition movements
just as it would be able to attack enemies
during war.
Security Council Resolution 1970 called
on Libya to respect IHL while the conflict
was developing into a non-international
armed conflict, as it has now been categorized by the president of the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The
conflict in Libya has certainly triggered
the application of IHL, as the armed rebels
have been organizing under the direction
of the Rebel Council based in Benghazi.
Accordingly, the conflict in Libya is regulated by the Fourth Geneva Convention,
Additional Protocol I, Additional Protocol
II, and customary international law. A
fundamental principal of IHL codified by
the Fourth Geneva Convention is civilian
distinction, which obligates the Libyan
government to protect civilians who are not
participating in hostilities and prohibits the
government from directly firing at or violently attacking unarmed civilian protestors. Nevertheless, Qaddafi and his forces
have repeatedly breached these obligations
by directing snipers to target civilians and
by firing cluster munitions into residential
neighborhoods. Libyan government forces
have also forcibly disappeared at least
thirty civilians and rebels, in violation
of customary international law applicable
in non-international armed conflicts and
international human rights law. The Libyan
government has also employed the use of
mercenaries to violently suppress peaceful protestors, in violation of Additional
Protocol I. A mercenary is defined as any
person who is specifically recruited locally
or abroad for the purpose of a concerted act
of violence to undermine the constitutional
order of a State and is motivated by material compensation.
In Syria and Yemen, although some
protestors have begun to arm themselves,
they are neither organized nor does the
violence rise to the level of a non-international armed conflict. For instance, there
is no command structure and violence on
behalf of the protestors has been sporadic.
In accordance with ICRC provisions in
situations not governed by IHL, if the
struggle in Syria and Yemen does not
amount to a non-international armed conflict, then the governing state authority
must restore internal order, while respecting
human rights. Both states have recklessly

Human Rights Brief, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 9
disregarded this important obligation, as
the uprisings in the two countries have
turned deadly.

Conclusion
The revolutions across the Arab world
have highlighted the importance of respecting a wide array of international human
rights provisions. Not only were the protests largely in response to the curtailment
of social, economic, and political rights
in their countries, but the very act of protesting has challenged oppressive government regulations that have disregarded key
provisions in international human rights
and humanitarian law. While some governments, like Jordan, limitedly violated
international law in trying to quell the
protests; others, like Syria and Yemen,
have responded with unlawful excessive
force to the protestors’ peaceful demands
for change. Although each movement has
taken on a different form, they have all
highlighted that civil society in the Arab
world is eager and willing to fight for the
basic rights that they have been denied for
so long.
Shubra Ohri, a J.D. candidate at the Washington
College of Law, covers the Middle East and
North Africa for the Human Rights Brief.

Sub-Saharan Africa
Power is Everything: The Costs
of Ethiopia’s Ambitious Pursuit of
Hydro-Electrical Power
In 2005, the government of Ethiopia
announced an ambitious 25-year plan to
construct a series of hydroelectric dams
along the Omo River in an effort to become
a regional supplier of electricity. Since
then, Ethiopia has opened several new
dams, including Gibe I and Gibe II, and is
scheduled to finish construction of the controversial Gibe III dam by July 2011. When
completed, Gibe III will be the largest
infrastructure project in Ethiopian history
and the highest dam on the African continent. Since construction began in 2006,
international groups have criticized the
Ethiopian government’s failure to consult
indigenous groups about the project or
to conduct environmental impact assessments on the region’s already fragile ecosystem. As a result of the government’s
noncompliance with required economic
and social safeguard policies, the African

Development Bank, the World Bank, and
the European Investment Bank have all
decided not to provide loans for the project. However, Ethiopia recently secured
U.S. $500 million from the Industrial and
Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) to
complete the Gibe III dam and also signed
a memorandum of understanding for China
to finance construction of the Gibe IV dam
and other future projects on another river,
the Blue Nile.
The Omo River is the lifeline for hundreds of thousands of people from eight
distinct indigenous groups in the South
Omo region of Ethiopia and the Lake
Turkana region of Kenya. Opponents of
the Gibe III project argue that the dam
will reduce the river’s flow and threaten
the livelihoods of thousands of people who
rely on its natural flood cycle for food
cultivation. Organizations such as Survival
International and International Rivers are
also highly critical of the government’s
plan to lease out tracts of newly irrigated
land to foreign investors upon completion
of the project. Additionally, the project will
affect Kenya’s Lake Turkana, the world’s
largest desert lake, which receives up to
ninety percent of its water from the Omo
River. A hydrology study by the African
Development Bank found that the water
volume required to fill the Gibe III reservoir would deprive Lake Turkana of
approximately 85 percent of its normal
annual water inflow. Furthermore, critics
of the Gibe III assert that restricting the
flow of the Omo River will exacerbate
food insecurity in a remote region that has
already suffered through a long history
of conflict between struggling indigenous
groups.
Gibe III’s projected ecological and social
impacts illustrate what is at stake as the
Ethiopian government repeatedly fails to
comply with its national and international
legal obligations. Domestically, the Ethiopian
government disregarded provisions of its
Federal Public Procurement Directive requiring competitive international bidding for
large-scale projects by directly awarding a
no-bid contract for Gibe III to the Italian
construction company, Salini Costuttori,
for more than U.S. $2 billion. After the
contract was awarded, construction began
in July 2006 without completion or
approval of the Environmental and Social
Impact Assessment (ESIA) that is required
by Ethiopian environmental law. In 2008,
the Ethiopian Environmental Protection
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Authority retroactively approved an ESIA
for Gibe III, without completing geological
or baseline health studies. Contrary to ESIA
requirements, the Ethiopian government did
not consult any affected communities until
after construction had already started, and
to date only about 100 people have been
consulted about the project. Opponents
argue that this violates Article 92(3) of
the Ethiopian Constitution, which requires
consultation of affected communities. On an
international level, the construction of Gibe
III runs contrary to the UN Declaration
of Indigenous Rights, which declares the
right of indigenous people to develop, use,
and control their traditional lands and to
obtain redress when this land is confiscated,
destroyed, or damaged without free, prior,
and informed consent. Furthermore, critics
argue that Ethiopia has violated Article 21,
the peoples’ right to freely dispose of their
wealth and natural resources, of the African
Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, to
which Ethiopia is party.
Advocacy groups maintain that no real
or genuine effort has ever been made to
consult the linguistically and physically
isolated indigenous communities of the
Lower Omo region. The managers of Gibe
III have made very little information publicly available, and numerous independent
surveys have reported that the indigenous
communities of the region know virtually
nothing about the project. This problem has
been further exacerbated by the Charities
and Societies Proclamation passed by the
Ethiopian Parliament in February 2009,
which restricts any charity or NGO from
promoting human and democratic rights in
Ethiopia if it receives more than ten percent
of its funding from foreign sources. The
resulting revocation of community association licenses by the Ethiopian government
has restricted the ability of advocacy groups,
the vast majority of which are funded internationally, to increase awareness within the
country about the project and its impacts
among affected communities.
In contrast, groups in Kenya that will
be affected by Gibe III have been able to
protest openly about the project and have
garnered significant international support. In 2006, the government of Kenya
signed a memorandum of understanding
with Ethiopia for the purchase of 500 MW
of electricity from the Gibe III dam. In
response, Friends of Lake Turkana filed
a law suit against the Kenyan government
claiming that this agreement violates the
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constitutional right of the Kenyan people to
a clean and healthy environment. To date,
no such public discourse or legal action has
been permitted in Ethiopia.
Ethiopia is Africa’s second most populous
state and currently only about two percent of
the population have access to electricity. As
such, the need for Ethiopia to develop and
implement a comprehensive energy plan
is not in dispute. But Ethiopia’s increasingly repressive government has denied
any public debate about Ethiopia’s energy
future and has compromised the quality of
the country’s hydroelectric dam projects.
Opponents argue that greater transparency
and consultation in the planning and implementation of hydropower projects could
lessen the negative social and environmental
impacts and result in better-designed, costeffective projects that comply with domestic and international law. But Ethiopia’s
government appears steadfastly opposed to
this path. Prime Minister Zenawi has criticized Western interference in the project as
an attempt to keep Ethiopia “undeveloped
and backward,” and has vowed to complete
construction of all planned hydroelectric
dams “at any cost.” At present, it appears
that construction of Ethiopia’s massive
dams will continue, illustrating the point
made by Abdulhakim Mohammed, Head
of Generation Construction at the Ethiopia
Electric Power Corporation (EEPCO): in
Ethiopia power is and will continue to be
“everything.”
Catherine Davies, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College of
Law, contributed this column on Sub-Saharan
Africa for the Human Rights Brief.

Political Obstacles Continue to
Prevent Action by Zimbabwe’s
First Human Rights Commission
After 31 years of independence, the
Zimbabwean government is still struggling
to address past human rights violations,
including the abuses that occurred during
the violent, disputed elections of 2008. In
the aftermath of those events, the political parties that formed the Government
of National Unity (GNU) agreed to create
a Human Rights Commission by constitutional amendment, which was passed
in 2009. The Commission’s creation initially brought hope to Zimbabweans, who
believed that it would hold accountable
those responsible for the government’s
numerous past human rights abuses and

pave the way for free and fair elections
in the future. Nearly two years later, this
Commission seems to have made little
progress because of political stalemate
delaying legislative authorization of many
of its important functions and the government’s failure to finance its work.
Zimbabwe’s Human Rights Commission
derives its legal authority from Section
100R of the constitution. Section 100R
expressly enables the Commission to take
over investigations initiated by the Public
Prosecutor, to promote the development and
awareness of human rights in Zimbabwe,
and to investigate complaints it receives.
Yet the specific functions that would fully
allow the Commission to accomplish its
investigatory functions, which are envisioned under Section 100R(8), have yet to
be conferred by parliamentary act. These
include the independent activities that are
typical for similar national human rights
commissions: conducting investigations on
its own initiative; visiting prisons, refugee
camps, and mental institutions to evaluate
conditions; and securing reparations for
victims of human rights violations.
In September 2010, the Ministry of
Justice and Legal Affairs introduced a
bill to grant these additional powers to
the Commission, but the bill still has not
passed. Human rights groups in Zimbabwe
have blasted the proposed bill for not
addressing past human rights abuses and the
bill’s design. The mandate it proposes for
the Commission explicitly does not cover
government-sanctioned massacres against
the Gukurahundi people. Nearly 20,000
Matabeleland and Midlands peoples were
killed in these massacres in the early 1980s
under the direction of President Robert
Mugabe. Thus, this exclusion strongly suggests government interference with the
scope of the Commission. Any bill granting the Commission extensive powers or
enlarging its mandate to include crimes like
the Gukurahundi massacres, would likely
not receive support from President Mugabe
or the ruling Zimbabwe African National
Union — Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party.
Zimbabwe’s Parliament is currently split
between Mugabe’s ZANU-PF, which holds
45 percent of the seats in the Senate and the
House of Assembly, and the Movement for
Democratic Change, which holds approximately 51 percent of the seats. Moreover,
any bill that passes the legislature must
receive Presidential approval before it can
become law.
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The current stalemate over the
Commission’s functions carries forward
the reluctance and delay that has plagued
the Commission since its beginning. It
took the GNU over a year to swear in the
eight-member Commission in April 2010.
Particularly controversial was the appointment of the Commission’s Chairperson,
Reginald Austin, who was MDC’s candidate for the position. Recently, Austin went
on record to express mounting frustration
with the Commission’s slow progress: “It’s
over a year since we were sworn in, but
we still have no Act which gives us power
to perform our mandate. Besides, we do
not even know how we are going to operate because there is no law to guide us.”
Further, the Commission requires a budget
of approximately U.S. $8 million per year
to accomplish its constitutional mandate,
according to Austin, but has had no budget
at all since its creation.
Other African national human rights
commissions have suffered a similar plight,
with political will to create a strong, independent institution failing shortly after
creation. In 2000, Niger established its
National Commission on Human Rights
and Fundamental Liberties (NCHRFL).
But, when the NCHRFL found the government’s removal of traditional chiefs to be
illegal in 2002, the government attempted
to restructure it. Civil society organizations prevented the restructuring of the
NCHRFL for a period of time. However,
the government eventually succeeded and
the NCHRFL now includes more government representation, compromising its
independence and rendering it ineffective.
Yet, not all such commissions are
doomed to fail. Establish in 2002, the
Kenya National Commission on Human
Rights (KNCHR) is authorized to investigate human rights violations and monitor
government institutions. The KNCHR’s
record of quick investigation and response
to alleged abuses demonstrates that it is not
afflicted with the same levels of political
manipulation or incapacity as Niger’s or
Zimbabwe’s commissions. Recently, for
example, it investigated complaints about
reproductive health and access to quality
healthcare and found systematic human
rights abuses. In response, the KNCHR
will conduct public hearings, primarily
in rural areas, to educate Kenyans about
reproductive and health rights. Although
the success of the campaign remains uncertain, other human rights commissions can
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control of formerly independent govern- “on-demand” services, including blogs
and videos. Goals of the AVMS include
ment institutions.
safeguarding media pluralism, preservUnder the Act, the Media Council will
The unwillingness of the Zimbabwean
ing cultural diversity, and guaranteeing
government to grant powers and fund the use poorly defined standards to regulate
the political independence of national
Commission comes at a delicate time television, radio stations, newspapers,
media regulators. The new Hungarian Act
for the country. According to Amnesty online news sources, and even personal
also runs counter to the standards of the
International, arbitrary arrests and torture blogs. Some of these standards include
Organization for Security and Co-operation
by police forces have increased since protection of public order, lack of balance,
in Europe (OSCE), including the right
February, along with excessive limitations and appropriate information in relation
to free media, editorial independence,
on freedoms of expression and assembly. to public affairs. The ambiguity of the
and media pluralism. The OSCE issued a
Six activists who organized a peaceful criteria could lead to self-censorship by
strongly-worded statement, declaring that
public discussion about the unrest in Egypt media in order to avoid fines. Moreover,
the Act “violates OSCE media freedom
and the Middle East now face charges the government’s direct appointment of the
standards and endangers editorial indeof treason and, if they are convicted, the NMHH members, without parliamentary
pendence and media pluralism.” With the
death penalty. Without a functional Human approval, raises concerns that the body
new Fidesz government receiving criticism
Rights Commission to afford oversight, will lack political independence. In addifrom certain political and media segments,
tion, the nine-year renewable and unlimsuch abuses can continue unabated.
there are concerns that the new law will be
ited terms for the Media Council’s five
used to suppress such expression.
Roushani Mansoor, a J.D. candidate at the
members may concentrate control over
American University Washington College of
With Hungary having assumed the
the media among a few hands and, thus,
Law, contributed this column on Sub-Saharan
undermine media pluralism. Finally, one Presidency of the EU Council on the same
Africa for the Human Rights Brief.
of the Media Council’s most worrisome day the Act was passed, the EU’s credibility
powers is its authority to impose fines and its protection of fundamental rights are
of up to €300,000 for periodicals and also at stake. Debates have been held in
Europe
€730,000 for broadcast media that violate Strasbourg by the EU Civil Liberties and
the Act. After such a violation, media com- Culture Committees to assess the Act’s
Media Law in Hungary Raises
panies may also be denied future licenses. legality. In a January 21, 2011 letter to
Concerns among European
Hungary’s Deputy Prime Minister Tibor
Community and Tests EU
The Act has sparked heated debate and
Navracsics, European Commissioner Neelie
Credibility
protest within Hungary. On January 27,
Kroes outlined three main points of conOn January 1, 2011, a new media law 2011, several thousand protesters gathered,
cern: the Media Act’s “balanced broadentered into force in Hungary that, as for a second time, at the parliament buildcast” requirement, which permits potenAmnesty International warns, will impose ing in Budapest to demonstrate against the
tially restrictive regulation of media that
potentially wide-ranging restrictions on Act and demand freedom of the press. Yet,
takes one side of an issue; the “country of
freedom of expression. The Media Services some argue that the Act protects society by
origin” principle that allows for censorship
and Mass Media Act (the Act) establishes providing for the regulation of media that,
of foreign broadcasts; and the registration
two government-appointed entities, the according to the text of the law, “infringe[s]
requirement for all media, which would creNational Media and Communications upon human dignity”; discriminates on
ate an “unjustified restriction” on the funAuthority (NMHH) and the Media Council, grounds of gender, racial or ethnic origin, or
damental right of “freedom of expression.”
which are vested with the power to oversee nationality; or exposes minors to programs
The European Commission requested
and regulate all media outlets. These two that may impair their development such as
entities extend state control to all realms of those involving pornography or extreme more information on the law to determine
public and private media. Such expansive violence. Just the day after the law was whether it complies with EU legislation and
state control, in conjunction with poorly enacted, opposition parties in the Hungarian fundamental rights and gave Hungary until
defined regulatory standards, represents Parliament appealed it to the country’s February 4, 2011 to respond. As a result of
a very real threat to the freedom of the Constitutional Court. However, chances for such pressure, the Hungarian government
press that is guaranteed by the Hungarian overturn are slim given the Court’s support agreed to review its media laws to ensure
that they conform to EU legislation, after
Constitution and Article 10 of European for the ruling Fidesz party.
which the EU will make a legal assessment
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
The Media Act has received harsh
to determine if the changes are in line with
For this reason, the Act is rousing great
criticism. Many European nations critiEuropean policy on media freedom. On
concern, particularly in light of Hungary’s
cize the Act for violating Article 62 of
February 16, 2011, the communications
current role in the eighteen-month Trio
Hungary’s constitution, which recognizes
secretary for the Hungary state said that
Presidency of the European Union.
freedom of the press, as well as Article
proposed amendments to the law, including
The architect behind the Act is the cur- 10 of the ECHR, which guarantees the
adjustments to the balanced-coverage prorent Fidesz government, which won the right to freedom of expression, and the EU
visions, would be submitted to Parliament
2010 elections by a two-thirds majority. Audiovisual and Media Services Directive
within two weeks. Following these amendThe conservative Fidesz government has (AVMS). The AVMS aims to coordinate
ments, if the European Commission deterfaced recent criticism for rapid centraliza- national EU Member States’ legislation
mines that Hungary has failed to comply
tion of political power and increased state concerning traditional TV broadcasts and
with EU law, the European Commission
learn from the KNCHR’s responsiveness to
complaints and tangible activities.
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has reserved the right to send a formal
notice letter to the Hungarian government, initiating a legal proceeding against
the country’s government. The Hungarian
government has assured the Commission
that they are listening to its concerns and
are willing to take appropriate action.
Although this engagement is promising,
it remains unclear whether it will be sufficient to keep the Act from undermining
freedom of the press.

The UK Defies European Court
of Human Rights by Denying All
Prisoners the Right to Vote
Six years after the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled that the
United Kingdom’s law denying prisoners
the right to vote is a violation of Article
3 of Protocol No. 1 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),
UK lawmakers have yet to implement the
Court’s ruling. In November 2010, the
Council of Europe requested that the UK
government implement the ECtHR’s judgment within six months.
The 2005 decision in Hirst v. The United
Kingdom (No. 2) affirming the right of UK
prisoners to vote has led to considerable
international pressure on the UK to change
its policy. The case originated from a 2001
application lodged with the ECtHR by
a convicted prisoner in the UK, and was
appealed to the ECtHR Grand Chamber in
October 2005 which upheld the ruling of
the Court. Specifically, the ECtHR ruled
that the ability to vote is a right, not a privilege, of all UK citizens, including prisoners. In Hirst, the ECtHR stated that “prisoners in general continue to enjoy all of the
rights and freedoms [including the right to
vote] guaranteed under the Convention,
save the right to liberty.” Additionally, the
ECtHR stated that national legislatures can
impose restrictions on prisoners’ right to
vote so long as they are tailored to particular offenses or offenses of a particular
gravity. According to the ECtHR, denying convicted prisoners this right without
consideration of the length of the individual’s sentence or the gravity of the offense
constitutes disproportionate punishment.
The ECtHR determined that an “automatic
blanket ban imposed on all convicted prisoners, which was arbitrary in its effects,
could no longer be said to serve the aim
of punishing the applicant once his tariff
(time period representing retribution and
deterrence) had expired.”

British law has denied prisoners the
right to vote for over 140 years. This limitation is currently codified in Section 3 of
the Representation of the People Act of
1983 (the Act) which states “A convicted
person during the time that he is detained
in a penal institution in pursuance of his
sentence or unlawfully at large when he
would otherwise be so detained is legally
incapable of voting at any parliamentary
or local government election.” The law is
rooted in the concept that incarceration
not only removes prisoners from society,
but also limits the enjoyment of prisoners’
individual rights, including the right to
vote, and the right to liberty. A convicted
person is defined in the Act as any person
found guilty of an offense (whether under
the law of the UK or not) including a person found guilty by a court of a service
(Armed Forces) offense but not including
a person dealt with by committal or other
summary process for contempt of court.
Once released from prison, however, a
former prisoner’s right to vote is reinstated.
Similar laws preventing prisoners from
voting regardless of the length of their
sentence or the gravity of the offense committed are in force in eight other European
states. However, based on the Rules of
Court for the ECtHR, until a legal challenge is brought in the aforementioned
countries, the European Council will not
proactively demand changes to the countries’ domestic legislation.
The prolonged legal argument between
the ECtHR and the UK may be coming to
an end. In late February 2011, the House
of Commons voted 234 to 22 to uphold the
ban on prisoners’ right to vote. Although the
House of Commons decision is not binding
until it is passed by the House of Lords, it is
an indicator of the strong attitude to do only
“the minimum necessary” to comply with
ECtHR. This could include only allowing
prisoners serving shorter prison sentences
to vote. Additionally, in early March, the
UK requested that the Grand Chamber of
the ECtHR review and consider overturning
the ruling in Hirst. The ECtHR will review
the UK’s compliance under the doctrine of
the margin of appreciation, a concept developed by the ECtHR which provides deference to the differing methods states use in
implementing requirements of the ECHR.
However, before the Grand Chamber can
rule on the implementation, the judges must
first determine whether to review the case
de novo.
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On March 9, 2011, after reviewing
Britain’s response to the Hirst ruling, the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe issued an unprecedented warning
to the British Government that they must
take urgent steps to enable prisoners to
vote in the forthcoming general election.
If the UK decides not to implement the
ECtHR’s requirements in their domestic
policy, the ECtHR, under Article 41 of the
ECHR granting the court jurisdiction to
afford just satisfaction to injured parties,
may order the UK to pay compensation to
prisoners who were denied the right. The
Parliament’s disregard for the ECtHR’s
decision presents the UK government with
the challenge of deciding between the democratically elected legislature’s decision
and compliance with the ECtHR’s ruling.
The future of the UK ban on prisoners’
right to vote also has important implications for the authority of the ECtHR
as members of the UK Parliament have
criticized the power of the ECtHR to rule
counter to the decisions of Parliament.
This issue has breathed life into fringe
debates on whether the UK could withdraw
from the ECHR and the jurisdiction of the
ECtHR. Given that the UK was among
the first countries to ratify the ECHR, and
has had a good record of complying with
the ECtHR judgments, withdrawal from
the ECHR is highly unlikely. Due to the
wide publicity that this issue has received,
the potential negative impact on the perceived legitimacy of the ECtHR is of great
concern and will depend on the upcoming
decisions of the UK Parliament.
Molly Hofsommer, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College of
Law, covers Europe for the Human Rights Brief.

South and Central Asia
Protecting Religion or Proscribing
Expression?: Pakistan’s Blasphemy
Law
Defamation of the Prophet Muhammad
in Pakistan is punishable by death, under
the state’s blasphemy law. As a State Party
to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR), Pakistan
is bound to respect and ensure civil and
political rights, including one’s opinions.
However, in January 2011, the Pakistani
government charged a seventeen-year-old
student for scribbling derogatory remarks
about the Prophet Muhammad on an exam.
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The police have refused to report what
Muhammad Samiullah wrote because
doing so would also be “blasphemous.”
The blasphemy law was added to
Article 295-C of Pakistan’s criminal code
in 1986, after General Zia-ul-Haq introduced the Islamic Sharī˒ah legal code.
Blasphemy is defined as the act of speaking sacrilegiously of a religious leader
or things sacred to a religion. Pakistan’s
blasphemy law mandates the death penalty
or life imprisonment for those who defame
the Prophet. Hundreds of people have been
charged under the law since its inception, even for merely disrespectful indirect
insinuations.
Pakistan signed and is bound by the
ICCPR in 2008, but has made several
key reservations, including to two articles
relevant to alleged religious defamation.
Article 18 authorizes the right to freedom
of thought and religion and Article 19
allows one to hold opinions without interference. Pakistan rejected these provisions
insofar as they conflict with Pakistani and
Sharī˒ah law. Furthermore, Pakistan is not
a party to the ICCPR’s Optional Protocol,
which would subject Pakistan to the jurisdiction of the United Nations (UN) Human
Rights Council. Because Pakistan refused
to be fully bound by the ICCPR’s freedom
of expression standards or the Human
Rights Council’s enforcement mechanism,
challenging the blasphemy law will be
very difficult from the international law
perspective.
However, the application of the blasphemy law also appears discriminatory
because prosecutions tend to specifically
target members of religions other than
Islam. Articles 26 and 27 of the ICCPR are
fully binding on Pakistan. Article 26 calls
for states parties to treat all persons as equal
before the law and prohibits discrimination
based on religion or opinion. Additionally,
Article 27 specifically protects the right of
minority religions to practice.
According to a Human Rights Watch
report, the blasphemy law only protects
Islam, and as a result, Christians and
Ahmadiyya — Muslims who do not believe
Muhammad was the final prophet — have
come under attack. A 2010 Freedom House
report notes that while Christians and
Ahmadiyya make up only two percent of
the population, they represent nearly half
of the more than 900 prosecutions for blasphemy. For instance, in November 2010,

a Christian mother of five was sentenced
to death for criticizing Islam to a group
of female farmhands. This is the first time
that a woman has been convicted under the
blasphemy law.
Fortunately, death sentences under the
blasphemy law are almost universally overturned or commuted on appeal, and no
one in Pakistan has yet been put to death
under the blasphemy law. However, opponents of the blasphemy law have expressed
uneasiness with the death penalty even
being an option. Their uneasiness grew in
November 2010, when a member of the
conservative Pakistan People’s Party (PPP)
tabled and ended discussion on a bill that
would prohibit death sentences for blasphemy convictions. Even though no one
has been put to death under the blasphemy
law, opposition parties and judges who
have pardoned the convicted have been
killed in reaction to their decisions.
Also, under pressure from the PPP
leadership and after death threats from
various sources, former Minister Sherry
Rehman withdrew efforts to complete a
draft amendment to the blasphemy law.
According to Rehman, Prime Minister
Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani refused to allow
Parliament to even discuss the amendment proscribing the death penalty and
disbanded the committee to amend laws.
On March 24, 2011, the UN Human
Rights Council adopted Resolution A/
HRC/16/L.38 “Combating intolerance,
negative stereotyping and stigmatization
of, and discrimination, incitement to violence, and violence against persons based
on religion or belief.” The non-binding
Resolution encourages states to combat
religious discrimination without limiting
freedom of expression. Pakistan is directly
addressed in the Resolution, and the
Council recently interviewed some individuals negatively affected by the blasphemy
law before the Resolution was adopted.
Pakistan is free to make reservations
when it accedes to international human
rights instruments, but it is clear that
further efforts need to be made to protect
freedom of religion and speech in Pakistan.
In order to do so, Pakistan could rescind
its reservations to the ICCPR and become
party to the Optional Protocol. Otherwise,
the protection of one view of one religion
is likely to continue to take priority over
the protection of individual rights.
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His Day in Court? Sri Lankan
President Sued in the United States
On January 28, 2011, family members
of three people allegedly killed in violation of the 1991 Torture Victim Protection
Act (TVPA) sued Sri Lankan President
Percy Mahendra “Mahinda” Rajapaksa.
The petition in Manoharan v. Mahendra
Rajapaksa was filed in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia
to seek thirty million dollars in damages
for victims of the conflict in Sri Lanka.
The plaintiffs’ lawyers, however, have serious hurdles to overcome regarding notice,
jurisdiction, and immunity.
The Manoharan suit comes in the
wake of a 25-year conflict between the
Sri Lankan government and the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which
ended in May 2009. The ethnic civil war
led to thousands of civilian casualties and
injuries, as well as forced disappearances.
The conflict came to a head in 2009 when
government forces pushed the LTTE into a
small area in northeastern Sri Lanka.
In Manoharan, the petitioners bring six
claims under the TVPA against President
Rajapaksa for deaths occurring during the
Sri Lankan civil war. The TVPA allows civil
suits to be filed in the United States against
individuals acting in official capacities who
commit torture or extrajudicial killing.
The plaintiffs filed the complaint on
behalf of six people who were killed in Sri
Lanka. Ragihar Manoharan was a twentyyear-old college graduate and member
of the ethnic Tamil minority. Sri Lankan
security forces allegedly beat him and
shot him in the back of the head. Premas
Anandarajah was one of seventeen humanitarian workers from Action Contre La
Faim (“Action Against Hunger”) who was
deployed to the town of Muttur to provide aid. Despite clear markings on the
group’s compound as a neutral humanitarian aid organization (making it illegal
to attack), Sri Lankan military forces allegedly attacked the compound and massacred everyone there. The third plaintiff
represents four members of the Thevarajah
family who were huddled in a no-fire zone
bunker when the Sri Lankan Navy allegedly bombarded them with artillery shells.
The plaintiffs allege that these acts
violated the TVPA because the killings
were committed extrajudicially under the
authority of the government. The TVPA
provides a cause of action for extrajudicial
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killings, which occur when a governmental authority kills a person without going
through the proper legal or judicial channels. The plaintiffs claim that the actions
were committed “under color of foreign
law under the command and control” of
Sri Lanka’s military and security forces
under President Rajapaksa.
Under the TVPA, plaintiffs must also
show that all local remedies have been
exhausted. The plaintiffs contend that
justice cannot be properly rendered in
Sri Lanka because the defendant has “politically compromised” the court system, and
the plaintiffs’ lives would be put at risk
by returning to Sri Lanka. An alternate
forum, Sri Lanka’s Lessons Learnt and
Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) was
established in 2010 to investigate issues
surrounding the civil war, but does not
have a mandate to hear individual claims.
The Manoharan petitioners may find
it difficult to fulfill the rigors of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including requirements for service and personal
jurisdiction, since the defendant is not only
a foreign citizen, but also a sitting head of
state. The Manoharan plaintiffs assert personal jurisdiction in federal district court
because the act “arose from a tortious
act in the District of Columbia,” and the
alleged violations fall under international
customary law. The complaint, however,
does not support its assertion that any of
the acts at issue took place in the District
of Columbia, since the complaint is about
violations that took place in Sri Lanka.
In order to satisfy service requirements,
the plaintiff in Manoharan requested
the Clerk of the U.S. District Court to
send a summons and complaint by mail
to President Rajapaksa’s residence in
Colombo, Sri Lanka. Additionally, the
attorneys attempted to fulfill service
obligations under the Hague Convention
on the Service Abroad of Judicial and
Extrajudicial Documents and sought an
order from the district court authorizing
service of summons and complaint on
the Sri Lankan embassy in the District
of Columbia, so as not to conflict with
provisions of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Immunity. As of publication,
the case has been assigned to Judge Colleen
Kollar-Kotelly, but no further public information regarding service of process on the
defendant is available.

In Mwani v. bin Laden, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit ruled that service of process was
met against a terrorist or terrorist organization when it was published in two
American publications and a London-based
Arabic language publication for six weeks.
However, this holding is seemingly limited
to terrorist organizations and perhaps organizations that cannot be reached through
traditional methods of service. In Mwani,
the court specifically discusses the impossibility of knowing a terrorist organization’s address. This method of service did
not apply to the Afghanistan government,
which was also a party to the suit. Because
the Manoharan defendant has a permanent
address, unlike the Mwani defendants, the
Mwani publication standard would likely
not be sufficient, and the plaintiffs would
need to use another method of service.
In addition to the notice and service
hurdles, the Manoharan plaintiffs also face
immunity challenges under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA). The
FSIA prohibits plaintiffs from bringing
most non-commercial suits against foreign states, their political subdivisions,
and their instrumentalities and agencies.
Under Chuidian v. Philippine National
Bank, individuals can also qualify as an
agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state. Other types of immunities, including
immunity under the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, may also block the
plaintiffs’ claims.
Specifically related to the TVPA,
in Belhas v. Ya Alon, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision
to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction under the FSIA where the foreign
defendant became available for service of
process when he traveled to the District of
Columbia for a think tank fellowship. The
Court ruled that the TVPA does not exempt
individuals from the FSIA, so an individual
may still enjoy immunity when he acts
in his official state capacity. The FSIA
could bar the suit against the Sri Lankan
president because the claim occurred in
the president’s capacity as an executive
official.
While the TVPA allows foreign plaintiffs to recover damages for extrajudicial killings, there are serious procedural
and substantive challenges to bring these
claims, even beyond those mentioned here.
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While the possibility of suing the Sri
Lankan president is a step toward achieving justice, the Manoharan attorneys have
an uphill battle to recover damages.
Misty Seemans, a J.D. candidate at the American
University Washington College of Law covers the South and Central Asia for the Human
Rights Brief.

Southeast Asia and Oceana
Rohingyas Seeking Protection and
Refuge
The Rohingyas are a Muslim ethnic
group located in the Rakhine (Arakan)
State of southwestern Burma. According
to Human Rights Watch, the Rohingyas
are subjected to systematic persecution
and human rights abuses at the hand of the
Burmese government, on account of their
ethnic identity. Abuses include extrajudicial killings, forced labor, forced land confiscation, torture, and restrictions on the
freedom of movement. Additionally, the
Burmese government continually refuses to
grant the group citizenship, rendering them
stateless in their own “ancestral homeland.” The persecution of the Rohingyas in
their homeland is further intensified by the
fact that they are unable to seek protection
from neighboring countries.
Recently, a group of 91 Rohingyas
claimed that on January 19, 2011, the Thai
navy set them out to sea in an engineless
boat with limited food and water. The
Rohingyas had fled the ethnic persecution
in Burma, but were apprehended in Thai
waters while trying to cross into Malaysia
in search of work. They landed on India’s
Andaman and Nicobar Islands in early
February. International human rights organizations have asked India, Indonesia, and
Thailand to grant the Rohingyas refugee
status in accordance with their obligations
under Articles 14 (right to seek and enjoy
in other countries asylum) and 15 (right to
a nationality) of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UDHR). These organizations are also requesting that the three
countries allow the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to
access the Rohingyas in order to provide
emergency assistance as well as counseling and advice on attaining refugee status.
If the Rohingyas are denied refugee status
and forced to return to Burma, they would
be at risk of continued or aggravated
human rights violations.
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Thai authorities have denied charges
that they set Rohingyan refugees out to sea
and claim that they returned the 91 persons detained in Thailand to Burma in late
January 2011. Panitan Wattanayagorn, the
Thai government spokesperson, claimed it
was “unlikely” that the Thai navy pushed
the Rohingya refugees out to sea, but that
a government investigation would take
place. Wattanayagorn explained that the
normal practice is to “prosecute refugees
who illegally enter Thai waters and then
deport them via land.” However, according to Amnesty International, the Thai
government had previously pushed hundreds of Rohingya asylum-seekers to sea in
“unseaworthy” boats in late 2008 and early
2009, leading to an undisclosed number of
fatalities, and diminishing the credibility
of Thailand’s denial of current charges.
Further, a June 2008 report by the U.S.
Committee for Refugees and Immigrants
(USCRI) gave Thailand’s refugee policy
“mixed reviews”; although Thailand has
hosted 1.2 million refugees over the past
30 years, it has refused to recognize most
refugees from Burma and has confined
thousands of Burmese refugees in camps
along the Burma-Thailand border with
diminished rights.
The Rohingyas are stateless persons
because of direct discrimination by the
Burmese government in its refusal to grant
the minority group citizenship. As stateless
persons, the Rohingyas have “no access to
employment, schools, health care, police
protection, or other public services.” They
cannot even freely move about the country, as they must get permission from
local authorities to travel from one village to another. This stateless condition
affects every aspect of daily life. According
to Human Rights Watch, the Burmese
government’s “violent and discriminatory treatment” of the Rohingyas directly
contributes to their chronic poverty and
has forced around 300,000 Rohingyas to
flee to nearby Bangladesh. However, the
Rohingyas still face serious problems in
Bangladesh due to their lack of official
documentation, and they often live in refugee camps with “primitive and squalid
conditions.” They are neither given official
resident status nor work authorization, thus
perpetuating vicious cycles of arrest, longterm detention, deportation to Burma, and
illegal re-entry via traffickers. Still, the
Rohingyas continue fleeing to Bangladesh
because, according to the Arakan Rohingya

National Organization, they believe the
country shares “the bonds of Islamic fraternity,” and therefore has a “historical and
moral obligation to endeavor for a permanent solution of the Rohingya problem.”
Although Thailand, India, and Indonesia
have not ratified the 1951 UN Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees or its
Protocol, the countries still have legal obligations under customary international law
to grant the Rohingyas refugee status. For
example, the UDHR has identified universal human rights to nationality and to seek
protection from persecution on account of
political crimes or other acts inconsistent
with the purposes and principles of the
United Nations.
Further, India and Thailand, as members
of the UNHCR’s Executive Committee,
are obligated to become parties to and
implement international conventions providing for the protection of refugees; admit
refugees to their territories, not excluding
those in the most destitute categories; and
promote the assimilation of refugees, especially by facilitating their naturalization.
The UNHCR’s official website explains,
“States with a demonstrated interest in
and devotion to the solution of refugee
problems” are considered for membership
in the Executive Committee. Therefore,
failure of these two countries to grant the
Rohingyas refugee status calls into question their dedication to protecting the most
destitute refugees. More importantly, the
three countries’ failure to affirmatively
act deprives the Rohingyas of a universal
human right under the UDHR — the right
to seek and enjoy asylum — while continuing to subject them to unstable living conditions, excluded from state recognition,
protections, and life-saving services.

Illegal Intercountry Adoptions:
Vietnam’s Progress and Remaining
Challenges
Intercountry adoption (ICA) began as
a humanitarian effort after World War II
to place orphaned children, for whom a
state could not find a family domestically, into families of willing foreigners.
In recent decades, ICA has grown into
a complex and substantially commercial
enterprise, lending itself to manipulation
and abuse. Such abuse is particularly evident in Vietnam, which began engaging
in ICA in the 1970s, and is now one of
the leading countries of origin of illegal
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adoptions, primarily due to adoption scams
and kidnappings conducted by unofficial
adoption agencies. International Social
Service (ISS), a non-profit organization
that assists internationally separated families, estimates that approximately 1,000
Vietnamese children are adopted annually
by families residing in the United States,
Canada, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy,
Sweden, and Switzerland.
Vietnam is a State Party to the
International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
The state’s failure to curb its illegal adoption market violates Article 10 of the
ICESCR guaranteeing the “widest possible [state-provided] protections and assistance” to families, particularly while they
are “responsible for the care and education of dependent children.” Illicit actors
taking advantage of lax enforcement of
laws or nonexistent adoption regulations
and familial protections have, easily and
with impunity, dismantled the Vietnamese
family by unlawfully taking children from
their biological families. Such actions also
violate provisions of the UN’s Convention
on the Rights of the Child (CRC) to which
Vietnam is also a State Party. The CRC
provides that States Parties must: respect
the right of the child to preserve his/her
family relations as recognized by the law
(Article 8), take measures to combat the
illicit transfer of children abroad (Article
11), and ensure that ICA does not result in
improper financial gain for those involved
in it (Article 21(d)).
A case that recently surfaced illustrates
the need for reform of Vietnam’s adoption framework. The case concerned a
2006 adoption scam of thirteen ethnic Ruc
children from Vietnam’s Quang Binh province. The biological parents have unsuccessfully lobbied for information about
their children’s whereabouts. They submitted complaints to authorities and openly
accused the responsible organization —
which operates under regulation the Quang
Binh Province’s Department of Labor, War
Invalids, and Social Affairs — of giving up
their children for adoption by foreigners
without the parents’ consent.
The 1993 Hague Adoption Convention
(Convention) promulgated international
safeguards and standards for the ICA process to be implemented by States Parties.
According to the U.S. Department of State
Bureau of Consular Affairs, the goal of the
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Convention’s drafters was to make adoption a last resort, and additionally “aims
to prevent the abduction, sale of, or traffic
in children, and [if adoption is necessary,]
it works to ensure that intercountry adoptions are in the best interests of children.”
A state joining the Convention must establish that it has a central authority, which
will function as the authoritative source of
information as well as the point of contact.
This central authority must also oversee
the accreditation of adoption agencies that
comply with uniform standards and ensure
professional and ethical practices, including the itemization and written disclosure
of the estimated expenses associated with
each adoption beforehand. More than seventy states are party to the Convention,
including the United States.
Due to increasing awareness of child
trafficking and pressure on the Vietnamese
government to better regulate its adoption agencies and procedures, the United
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF),
Vietnam, and the Department of Adoption
of the Ministry of Justice of Vietnam
commissioned a study to identify and
address problems in both domestic and
intercountry adoptions. The study, conducted by ISS and released in August
2010, identified inadequacy and inconsistency within the procedures for ensuring
“free and informed consent” by biological
parents. Accordingly, it urged Vietnamese
authorities to: clarify the laws regarding
parental consent for the adoption; establish
an official system of data collection for
children in need of adoption; assess the
causes of child abandonment, relinquishment, and separation; and develop social
service programs to address those causes.
In response to the study, the National
Assembly of Vietnam passed a law on child
adoption, which took effect on January
1, 2011. This law better considers the
rights and interests of adopted children. It
requires that officials handling child adoption issues must: 1) respect the child’s right
to live in his or her original environment;
2) ensure the lawful rights and interests
of the adopted child and the adopting
parents are respected (i.e., a voluntary
procedure, no sex discrimination, consistency with social norms); and 3) assure
that no willing Vietnamese family can be
found before permitting a non-resident
adoption. Passing this new law enabled
Vietnam’s Ambassador to the Netherlands,
Huynh Minh Chinh, to sign the Convention

on December 16, 2010. However, as of
May 2011, Vietnam is still considered a
“non-member” on the Convention’s official
website.
Despite the enactment of the new law
and its scheduled implementation, the U.S.
Department of State has not lifted its
ban on ICA with Vietnam. In September
2008, the U.S. suspended adoptions
from Vietnam, and the most recent State
Department advisory notice, issued in July
2010, asserted that “important steps must
still be taken before Vietnam completes
this reform process and before intercountry
adoptions between the United States and
Vietnam can resume.” These steps may
include: decreasing fraudulent documentation or the improper issuance of official
documents based on incorrect information, as was the case with at least one
of the thirteen Ruc children; eliminating
corruption and other official participation
in illegal adoptions; and shutting down
unlicensed facilities that prey upon single
pregnant women by providing them support in exchange for relinquishing parental
rights. If implemented, these measures,
in addition to Vietnam’s accession to the
Convention, will aid the success of adoption reforms and hopefully bring an end to
illegal ICA practices in Vietnam.
Leah Chavla, a J.D. candidate at the American
University Washington College of Law, covers
Southeast Asia and Oceana for the Human
Rights Brief.

East Asia
The Right to Conscientious
Objection and How South Korea
Falls Short
On February 10, 2011, Baek Jonggeon conscientiously objected to mandatory service in South Korea’s military.
The 26 year old Jehovah’s Witness faces
eighteen months in jail for violating the
country’s Military Service Act (MSA),
which requires all 19 to 35 year old Korean
men to serve a 21 to 24 month long military commitment. The MSA fails to recognize the right to conscientiously object
to military service — a right derived
from the freedom of thought, conscience,
and religion protected under Article 18 of
the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR). Instead of providing proportionate and non-punitive alternative service options as recommended by
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the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights (Commission) (now replaced by the
Human Rights Council), South Korea regularly imprisons conscientious objectors
— a practice that infringes upon the right
to conscientiously object, thereby violating
the country’s international obligations as a
State Party to the ICCPR.
Jong-geon, who aspires to join the legal
field, passed the South Korean judicial
examination in 2008, making him eligible
to become a judge, prosecutor, attorney,
or military judicial officer. In order to
complete this process, Jong-geon is obligated by the MSA to fulfill the mandatory military service. By refusing to do
so, Jong-geon faces a five-year bar from
becoming a judge, prosecutor, or attorney
in addition to the eighteen-month jail sentence. Conscientious objectors in South
Korea often face other consequences, such
as loss of licenses and business permits,
prohibition from jobs in any state agency,
and social stigmatization. As of February,
2011, 955 men were serving prison sentences for conscientious objection — a
fraction of the 15,000 men who have served
time for the crime over the last fifty years.
Jong-geon’s situation is representative of
the larger problem in South Korea, both
for Jehovah’s Witnesses who see military
service as inconsistent with their religion,
and for others who conscientiously object
to military service, because by imprisoning
these individuals, South Korea is failing to
protect the right to conscientiously object.
While the right to conscientiously
object to military service is not explicitly
granted by the ICCPR, the Commission
has repeatedly recognized it as implicit in
the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion outlined in Article 18 of the
ICCPR. In 1987, the Commission adopted
Resolution 1987/46, which recognized that
conscientious objection “derives from principles and reasons of conscience, including
profound convictions, arising from religions, ethical, moral or similar motives.”
The Commission went a step further in
1989 when it recognized conscientious
objection as a right deriving from the
rights to freedom of conscience, thought,
and religion established in Article 18 of
both the Universal Declaration on Human
rights and the ICCPR. In so finding, the
Commission called on States Parties to the
ICCPR requiring military service to introduce proportionate, non-punitive alternative service options. While providing alter-
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native service options is not obligatory, it is
recommended by the Commission as a best
practice in lieu of measures like imprisonment or discrimination.
Late South Korean President Roh Moohyun was sympathetic to the plight of
conscientious objectors, and in 2007, the
Ministry of National Defense announced
that alternative service options for conscientious objectors would become available
in 2009. However, shortly after President
Lee Myung-bak’s 2008 inauguration, and
a month prior to implementation, this plan
was postponed indefinitely and has yet
to be reintroduced. Affected parties filed
suit in South Korea’s Constitutional Court
and await a ruling on the constitutionality
of the MSA. Regardless of the outcome,
South Korea’s imprisonment of conscientious objectors and failure to introduce alternative service options violates the country’s
international obligations under the ICCPR.

China’s Continuing Crackdown
on House Churches Infringes on
Religious Freedom
Throughout April and May 2011, hundreds of Chinese Protestant Christians
were detained for attempting to hold openair religious services in Beijing. Shouwang
church pastor Zhang Xiaofeng and congregation members organized the services
after government pressure resulted in the
church’s eviction from its meeting place.
According to the church, this latest eviction
is one of at least three successful attempts
by the government to block Shouwang’s
acquisition of a permanent meeting place.
China only protects the legal rights of
religious groups affiliated with stateregistered religions, and Shouwang, with
around 1,000 members, is one of the largest unregistered house churches in China.
While the government often turns a blind
eye to small gatherings of house churches,
it has been cracking down on Shouwang,
and house churches like it, by refusing
to recognize Shouwang legally and by
interfering with its ability to rent a meeting space. China’s obligations under its
own Constitution and 2005 Regulations
on Religious Affairs (RRAs), as well as
under the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR), require it to

protect freedom of religion. Nevertheless,
government regulations requiring alignment with state sanctioned institutions
infringe upon the religious rights of
Shouwang church and other similarly situated religious groups by constructively
compelling the groups to believe in a
particular form of Protestantism and by
discriminating against those who refuse.
China’s obligation to protect the right
to freedom of religion is found in Article
36 of the Chinese Constitution, the State
Administration for Religious Affair’s
(SARA) RRAs, and Article 18 of the
ICCPR, to which China is a signatory. The
Chinese Constitution states that citizens
“enjoy freedom of religious belief ” and
that citizens may not be “compel[led] .
. . to believe in, or not believe in, any
religion.” This guarantee is supplemented
by the RRAs, which were created to
“ensure freedom . . . of religious belief,”
but which require religious bodies to register with government. The ICCPR’s provisions in Article 18 protecting the freedom of religion are similar to those in
the Chinese Constitution, but include that
religious freedom “may be subject only to
such limitations as are prescribed by law
and are necessary to protect public safety,
order, health, or morals or the fundamental
rights and freedoms of others.” In a 1993
general comment, the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights emphasized that such limitations on the freedom
of religion must be narrowly construed and
that “[t]he fact that a religion is recognized
as a state religion or that it is established as
official . . . shall not result in any impairment of the enjoyment of any of the rights
under the Covenant . . . nor in any discrimination against adherents to other religions
or non-believers.”
While China considers Protestantism
one of five recognized religions, only
two Protestant churches — the ThreeSelf Patriotic Movement and the China
Christian Council — are state-sanctioned.
Many Christians disagree with the theologies of these state-sanctioned churches,
opting for the more or less stringent doctrines available in unregistered house
churches. Though SARA allows small
groups of family and friends to worship in
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homes, larger congregations are expected
to register with the government, necessarily affiliating themselves with one of the
two state-sanctioned Protestant churches.
While China often turns a blind eye
to smaller unregistered congregations,
recently, house churches have faced increasing government scrutiny, which many
believe to be linked to widespread crackdowns on dissent throughout the country.
These crackdowns, which coincide with
revolts in the Middle East, have resulted in
the arrests of high profile dissidents such
as artist and activist Al Weiwei. Since the
Middle Eastern revolts have inspired some
Chinese citizens to attempt to organize a
“Jasmine Revolution” within China, many
observers believe that the government’s
crackdown on house churches is an attempt
to curb dissent and maintain control.
While Shouwang refuses to join a statesanctioned church due to ideological differences, its attempts to register independently
with the government in 2006 were denied.
Because the government has failed to
publicly disclose evidence that Shouwang
poses a threat to “public safety, order,
health, or morals or the fundamental rights
and freedoms of others,” China’s refusal to
grant Shouwang legal recognition, as well
as its requirement that churches join statecontrolled congregations, infringes upon
the right to religious freedom as protected
by its Constitution, RRAs, and the ICCPR.
By requiring churches to affiliate with
particular ideologies in order to gain legal
recognition, and consequently, legal rights
such as the ability to secure a place of worship, China is failing to protect the ability
of these churches to “adopt a religion or
belief of [their] choice.”
Kaitlin Brush, a J.D. candidate at the Washington
College of Law, covers the East Asia for the
Human Rights Brief.

